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A Helping Hand is Hard at Work: Help-Seekers’ Underestimation of Helpers’ Effort 
 
Abstract 
Whether people seek help depends on their estimations of both the likelihood and the value of 
getting it.  Although past research has carefully examined how accurately help-seekers predict 
whether their help requests will be granted, it has failed to examine how accurately help-seekers 
predict the value of that help, should they receive it.  In this paper, we focus on how accurately 
help-seekers predict a key determinant of help value, namely, helper effort.  In four studies, we 
find that (a) helpers put more effort into helping than help-seekers expect (Studies 1-4); (b) 
people do not underestimate the effort others will expend in general, but rather only the effort 
others will expend helping them (Study 2); and (c) this underestimation of help effort stems from 
help-seekers’ failure to appreciate the discomfort—in particular, the guilt—that helpers would 
experience if they did not do enough to help (Studies 3 & 4).  
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 If a friend agreed to help you find a job, would you expect her to distribute your resume 
widely and offer a strong endorsement, or simply mention your name in passing to a couple of 
colleagues?  If a coworker said he would give you feedback on an important presentation you 
were preparing, would you expect him to pore over it in detail, or just give it a quick skim?  
Questions like these highlight the extent to which help quality can vary.  Yet despite this 
variability, questions about the quality of assistance one expects to receive should someone agree 
to help have drawn little research attention, even from studies aimed at understanding help-
seekers’ estimates of help outcomes.  Rather than examine help-seekers’ expectations of help 
quality, past research has examined help-seekers’ expectations of whether help will be given 
(Bohns, 2016; Bohns et al., 2011; Bohns, Newark, & Xu, 2016; Flynn & Lake (Bohns), 2008; 
Newark, Flynn, & Bohns, 2014; Roghanizad & Bohns, 2017).  But just as whether one 
anticipates rejection or acceptance influences one’s decision to ask for help, so too does one’s 
assessment of the quality of help at stake.  Like expectations of compliance, expectations of help 
quality play a critical role in explaining an individual’s motivation to seek assistance.  
Help Quality and the Expected Value of Receiving Help 
Most conceptions of intendedly rational or intelligent decision-making see action as 
guided by the anticipation of consequences (March, 1994).  According to expected utility theory, 
satisficing, and other models of purely and boundedly rational choice (March, 1994; Mas-Colell, 
Whinston, & Green, 1995; Simon, 1955), decision-makers identify their alternatives, consider 
the consequences that may result from each of those alternatives, and then evaluate the 
desirability of each potential consequence according to their preferences (March, 1994; Mas-
Colell et al., 1995).  Fundamental to these models is the notion of expected value.  In evaluating 
the desirability of decision alternatives, one must consider both the likelihood and value of each 
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of the consequences that may result from each alternative.  For example, in deciding whether a 
particular lottery is attractive enough to justify the costs of playing, an intendedly rational 
decision-maker considers both the odds of winning and the amount he or she stands to win.  Both 
pieces of information are vital. 
To make rational decisions, an individual must account for both the probability and value 
of the potential consequences of his or her actions.  This tenet of rationality holds across a 
variety of decision-making contexts; deciding whether to ask for help is no exception.  
Predictions of compliance and help quality should factor into the decision to request help.  
However, research on help-seeking has focused solely on help-seekers’ estimations of the 
likelihood of receiving help, should they request it (Bohns et al., 2011; Bohns et. al., 2016; Flynn 
& Lake (Bohns), 2008; Newark et al., 2014; Roghanizad & Bohns, 2017).  Help-seekers’ 
estimations of the value of that help, should they receive it, have largely been ignored.     
Identifying whether help-seekers accurately predict the quality of help they might receive 
is part and parcel of determining whether help-seekers are unduly reluctant to request help.  For 
example, help-seekers often underestimate the likelihood that their requests for help will be 
granted (Flynn & Lake (Bohns), 2008; Newark et al., 2014), suggesting that help-seekers may be 
better off requesting help more frequently.  However, if help-seekers underestimate the 
likelihood of receiving help but simultaneously overestimate the quality of help they are likely to 
receive, then encouraging help-seekers to seek help more often may be misguided.  For instance, 
unexpectedly poor quality help might leave help-seekers regretting their decision to seek 
assistance, wishing instead that they had avoided the stresses, anxieties, and feelings of 
indebtedness often associated with asking for, and receiving, help.  Moreover, helping takes time 
and receiving one form of help sometimes means that other avenues for addressing a problem 
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will not be pursued.  If in the end one is not much better off than one was at the beginning, that 
time may feel wasted and one’s overall position may feel worse.   
Conversely, if those in need of help underestimate the quality of help they would receive, 
in addition to underestimating the likelihood that helpers will agree to their requests, then the 
consequences of not asking for help are even worse than previously thought.  Not only would 
individuals who need assistance be leaving help on the table, so to speak, but that help would 
have been worth more than they think.  Simply put, to make a sound decision about whether to 
seek help, a person must have an accurate sense of both the likelihood of receiving that help and 
its value.  
Predictions of Helper Effort as a Key Determinant of Predictions of Help Quality 
Help-seekers’ predictions of help quality likely draw on the same factors that inform 
people’s assessments of others’ task performance more generally.  Classic work on this topic 
(e.g., Dugan, 1989; Rotter, 1966; Weiner et al., 1971; Weiner, 1979) has shown that the three 
most salient factors in assessing task performance are: (1) characteristics of the task, (2) 
competence of the person performing the task, and (3) effort of the person performing the task.  
An individual attempting to predict the quality of another’s performance on a particular task 
would consider the difficulty of the task, that person’s specific competencies, and the amount of 
effort that person was likely to put into succeeding at the task.  For example, if you knew that a 
colleague was working on a job application and you were to guess the quality of his or her cover 
letter, you would likely consider the nature of the task (How difficult is it to argue one’s worth to 
a prospective employer in a cover letter?), that person’s competencies (How capable is your 
colleague of making persuasive arguments in general?), and the amount of effort you would 
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expect your colleague to put into writing the cover letter (How motivated is your colleague to get 
this job?).   
Though a help-seeker would likely rely on these same three factors when predicting the 
quality of help he or she would receive, a helping interaction has unique dynamics that may bias 
help-seekers’ predictions of a helper’s motivation to expend effort.  That is, while assessment of 
a task’s difficulty and a person’s competencies to perform it should not be systematically 
influenced by whether the task is being performed for oneself, for the person performing the 
task, or for a third party, assessment of the amount of effort a person will put into a task is likely 
to be subject to bias in the context of a helping interaction.  This bias results from help-seekers 
having to judge not how motivated a person is to complete a task well, but how motivated a 
person is to complete a task well for them.  For example, consider the job application scenario 
described above, but this time imagine your colleague is writing you a letter of recommendation 
rather than writing his or her own cover letter.  If you were to guess the quality of the arguments 
he or she were to make in a letter written for you, you would once again consider the nature of 
the task (How difficult is the task of writing a persuasive letter?), your colleague’s competencies 
(How good is your colleague at making arguments in general?), and the amount of effort you 
would expect your colleague to put into writing the letter.  However, while in the former scenario 
effort was tied to your colleague’s self-interest (How motivated is your colleague to get this 
job?), in this scenario, effort is tied to your colleague’s prosocial motivation toward you (How 
motivated is your colleague to write you a good letter and help you get this job?).  Here, we focus 
on help-seekers’ estimations of helper effort because estimations of helper effort are the key 
determinant of estimations of help quality that are likely to be misjudged by help-seekers.  
Overestimating Versus Underestimating Help Effort 
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The accuracy of help-seekers’ predictions of help quality hinge on their expectations of 
how much effort another person is willing to invest in helping them. At first pass, the 
possibilities that help-seekers will either overestimate or underestimate help effort seem equally 
plausible.  However, we contend that help-seekers are more likely to underestimate the amount 
of effort helpers are willing to provide.  In the sections below, we outline the arguments for both 
predictions, and why we expect that help-seekers, in general, will underestimate the effort 
helpers are willing to exert on help-seekers’ behalf.  
The Case for Overestimating Help Effort  
Previous research on estimating the likelihood of saying “yes” to help requests has 
demonstrated that helpers often agree to provide assistance because of the discomfort they 
associate with refusing to help (Bohns et al., 2011; Flynn & Lake (Bohns), 2008; Newark et al., 
2014).  Help-seekers struggle to appreciate this discomfort; instead, they attribute the helper’s 
compliance to that person’s stable disposition as a “helpful person” (Gilbert & Malone, 1995; 
Jones & Harris, 1967; Newark et al., 2014).  This line of research suggests two important 
dynamics that could result in help-seekers overestimating help effort.  First, if potential helpers 
are driven primarily by the discomfort of refusing a request for help, their motivation to exert 
effort may be low once they decide to comply and their discomfort has been alleviated.  Helping 
behavior driven by discomfort may feel partly coerced, leading helpers to provide assistance that 
is merely perfunctory.  For instance, in one study, participants who felt coerced to comply with a 
request to volunteer at an event by a compliance technique (the fear-then-relief technique) signed 
up for fewer volunteering hours than those who did not feel coerced (Dolinski & Nawrat, 1998), 
which suggests that feeling obligated to comply with a request may result in low effort and, 
therefore, low quality help. 
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Second, if help-seekers assume that anyone who agreed to help must be a helpful person, 
they would likely believe that such a person would behave accordingly when it came time to 
perform the helping task.  That is, a “helpful person” would not simply agree to help, but would 
also work hard at helping.  However, this assumption may not be merited.  Work on moral 
licensing suggests that helpers’ need to feel like a “helpful person” could be fulfilled by simply 
agreeing to help.  That is, helpers could feel that they have already obtained “moral credits” just 
by saying “yes,” affirming their sense of self-worth and reducing the pressure they feel to 
demonstrate their morality through subsequent behavior (Merritt, Effron, & Monin, 2010).  In 
addition, help effort may be more difficult to observe or assess than compliance, thereby 
reducing the pressure of accountability on the helper (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999).  These dynamics 
could make putting great effort into helping less important to helpers than help-seekers think, 
resulting in an overestimation of help effort.    
The Case for Underestimating Help Effort  
Although help-seekers may expect helpers to put more effort into helping than they are 
actually willing to exert, we argue it is more likely that help-seekers will underestimate helpers’ 
effort.  Specifically, we predict that help-seekers will fail to grasp the discomfort that helpers 
associate with not doing enough to help, leading them to underestimate the effort that helpers are 
likely to expend.  
People tend to be more motivated to perform well when they have other people 
depending on them (Grant, 2008).  As such, effort is likely to increase in helping situations, in 
large part because of the discomfort helpers feel at the prospect of disappointing others.  
However, help-seekers are notoriously bad at recognizing others’ prosocial motivations, tending 
to underestimate the discomfort helpers would feel if they were to let down those who seek their 
  9 
aid (Bohns et al., 2011; Flynn & Lake (Bohns), 2008; Newark et al., 2014).  Noting this, we 
argue that help-seekers are likely to underestimate the discomfort associated with providing poor 
help, leading them to underestimate the effort others are willing to put into acts of assistance.  
The prospect of agreeing to help and then providing poor help is likely to generate at least 
as much, if not more, discomfort for potential helpers than the prospect of refusing to help in the 
first place.  Indeed, refusing someone’s request for help clearly violates the politeness norms of 
interpersonal interaction, making it quite uncomfortable to say “no” to another person’s request, 
especially face-to-face (Goffman, 1967; Grice, 1975).  However, saying “yes” to someone’s 
request for help introduces additional concerns that also entail discomfort.  Once someone else is 
dependent on us, we face the prospect of feeling guilty for letting him or her down (Wiltermuth 
& Cohen, 2014).  They have relied on us to improve their situation and failing to do so, 
especially for reasons within our control, would leave us feeling bad about ourselves.  We also 
face potential embarrassment and a threat to our self-esteem if we provide ineffective or subpar 
help (Dakof & Taylor, 1990; Marigold et al., 2014; Coyne, Wortman, & Lehman, 1988).  In this 
case, we may worry about how the person we attempted to help would see us or what they might 
think about us.  Finally, there is considerable pressure to behave in a manner that is consistent 
with our previous actions and statements (Aronson, 1992; Cialdini, 1993; Cialdini et al., 1999).  
Agreeing to be helpful, and ultimately being unhelpful, would engender feelings of dissonance.  
Taken together, these factors lead us to predict that helpers should be motivated to avoid the 
discomfort of providing low-quality help, driving them instead to invest considerable effort into 
helping.   
The discomfort helpers associate with not doing enough to help would likely be lost on 
help-seekers.  In general, people underestimate the role of embarrassment and discomfort as a 
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driver of others’ behavior (Bohns & Flynn, 2010; Sabini, Siepmann, & Stein, 2001; Van Boven, 
Loewenstein, & Dunning, 2005).  This effect has been demonstrated in a wide range of contexts, 
and there is no reason to expect that help-seekers would be any better at appreciating the role of 
discomfort in driving helpers’ effort than they are at appreciating its role in driving helpers’ 
compliance.  The inability of help-seekers to recognize helpers’ substantial discomfort suggests 
that help-seekers will underestimate helpers’ effort.  If this is the case, the costs of not asking for 
help are even more substantial than has previously been suggested: Not only might people be 
more likely to help than help-seekers assume, but the help they provide, and into which they put 
a great deal of effort, may also be more valuable than help-seekers believe.   
Overview of Studies 
The practical significance of this research rests, in part, on the assumption that 
expectations of help quality are an important factor in the decision to ask for help. Thus, before 
conducting our primary studies concerning help effort, we conducted a brief pilot study to test 
this assumption directly.  Then, for our principal empirical work, we conducted four studies to 
test whether help-seekers underestimate helpers’ effort, a key determinant of help quality.  In 
Study 1, we developed a scavenger hunt in which participants seeking a cash prize approached 
individuals on a university campus and asked them to answer simple trivia questions on an iPad.  
Before approaching these strangers, participants predicted the effort helpers would expend by 
estimating the number of questions helpers would answer, the number of questions they would 
answer correctly, and how much time they would spend answering questions.   
In Study 2, we conducted an online scenario study to examine whether this 
underestimation of effort was specific to help-seekers estimating the effort that a helper would 
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expend on them, or whether it was simply an example of a more general tendency people have to 
underestimate the effort of others, regardless of whom that effort benefits.    
In Study 3, we conducted an online study with four scenarios in order to replicate the 
finding from Studies 1 and 2, further demonstrate its generalizability to other types of requests, 
and test our proposed mechanism for the effect—namely, that help-seekers fail to recognize the 
discomfort helpers would experience if they did not do enough to help, which in turn motivates 
helpers to put more effort into helping than help-seekers expect.  
Finally, in Study 4 we conducted a second behavioral study to test both our main 
hypothesis and our proposed mechanism.  In this study, helpers watched and took notes on a 
TED Talk video about public speaking.  Help-seekers then used those notes to take a quiz about 
the video (which they were not allowed to watch themselves), receiving $0.25 for each correct 
answer.  Before taking the quiz, help-seekers estimated the discomfort helpers would feel if they 
did not do enough to help, as well as the effort helpers would put into their assistance.  These 
estimates were then compared to the actual discomfort experienced and effort expended  by 
helpers.        
For all experiments, we report all measures, conditions, and data exclusions. Sample size 
for each study was determined by the heuristic recommended by Simmons, Nelson, and 
Simonsohn (2013) of at least 50 participants per cell. 
Pilot Study 
In an initial pilot study, we asked 99 participants (51 women, MAge=33, SDAge=9.50) from 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk to read a short paragraph about asking for help (Appendix A).  We 
then asked them to answer two questions about what would typically drive their decision to ask 
for help: One about the extent to which their decision depended on how likely they thought a 
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potential helper would be to say “yes” to their request, the other about the extent to which their 
decision depended on the quality of help they thought a potential helper would provide, should 
they agree to help.  These questions, presented in counter-balanced order, were answered with 
either “Not at all,” “To a low extent,” “To a moderate extent,” “To a great extent,” or “This is 
essential.”   
We found that 92% of participants reported that their decision to ask for help was based 
at least to a moderate extent on expected help quality; in fact, more than half of participants 
(57%) reported that predicted help quality would either be essential to their decision or influence 
their decision to a great extent.  Notably, there was no significant difference between the 
distribution of responses participants reported for predicted help quality and the distribution of 
responses they reported for predicted request compliance, [McNemar-Bowker(7)=9.86, p=.20.]. 
Together, these results support the view that, although predicted compliance has been the focus 
of much of the research on help-seeking behavior, predicted help quality is also a significant 
factor in people’s decisions to ask for help.  
Study 1: Estimating Help Effort in a Scavenger Hunt 
 In the first test of our primary research question, we explored whether help-seekers would 
underestimate the effort of helpers who said “yes” to a direct, in-person request for help.  
Participants randomly approached unknown individuals on a college campus and asked them for 
help answering trivia questions for a scavenger hunt.  Before doing so, participants predicted 
helpers’ effort.  These predictions of effort were then compared to actual help effort since the 
people who complied with these requests actually provided the requested help.  
Participants 
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 Two hundred individuals participated in this study. Fifty primary participants (31 women, 
MAge=21.08, SDAge=2.46) from two American universities
1 were paid $20 to ask 150 secondary 
participants to help them win a scavenger hunt by answering trivia questions on an iPad.  At each 
university, the primary participant who got secondary participants to answer the most trivia 
questions correctly was declared the winner.  This primary participant received a prize of a $25 
Amazon gift certificate, in addition to his or her $20 participation payment.  Secondary 
participants received no compensation for completing the helping task.  
Procedure and Materials 
Primary participants met the experimenter in a central campus location, where they had 
the entirety of their task explained to them.  Primary participants were told that they would be 
participating in a scavenger hunt in which they would randomly ask people they did not know to 
help them by answering trivia questions on an iPad.  They were instructed to approach only 
individual strangers (no groups) until they found three people who were willing to help, or until 
their hour-long timeslot had expired.  For each trivia question secondary participants answered 
correctly, primary participants would receive one point.  At the end of the study, the primary 
participant with the most points would receive a $25 gift card, in addition to his or her $20 
payment.   
 When primary participants approached a secondary participant, they recited the following 
script: “Excuse me, I’m taking part in a scavenger hunt and I was wondering if you would help 
me by answering a few trivia questions.”  If the secondary participant agreed to help or requested 
                                                 
1 Regression analysis showed that university location was not a significant predictor of any of 
our dependent variables (all ps ≥ .12), with the exception of primary participants’ estimates of 
the amount of time secondary participants would spend answering questions, β =-93sec, 
SE=40.53, t(48)=-2.30, p=.03.  As a result, in our analyses, we have pooled the results from the 
two campuses, but note this discrepancy when reporting results regarding time estimations.   
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more information, primary participants handed the secondary participant the iPad, on which 
appeared the following text:  
This individual is taking part in a scavenger hunt.  As part of this scavenger hunt, this individual is 
looking for people to answer some simple trivia questions.  For every question someone answers 
correctly, this individual will receive a point.  Whichever scavenger hunt participant ends up with 
the most points will receive a $25 gift certificate to Amazon. 
 
If you would like to take part and answer some trivia questions, please click the button below to 
begin.  There are 75 questions total, but you do not have to answer all of them—you can stop 
whenever you wish.  Just hand the iPad back to the participant when you are finished. 
 
After each interaction with a secondary participant, primary participants noted whether 
the secondary participant agreed to help.  If a secondary participant agreed to help, primary 
participants took a step back so that they were not interacting with secondary participants or 
hovering directly over them while they attempted to answer the questions.  Throughout the 
experiment, participants were observed at a distance by the experimenter. 
Before approaching any secondary participants, primary participants were given a pen 
and an iPad.  To the back of the iPad was taped a piece of paper with columns marked “yes” and 
“no” for primary participants to mark each secondary participant’s compliance response.  
Primary participants were also instructed how to go to “Bookmarks” on the iPad toolbar and 
reset the survey after any portion of it had been taken by a secondary participant.  
Next, primary participants took the entire survey themselves.  This step ensured that 
primary participants knew exactly what the task was before predicting the effort secondary 
participants would expend.  The survey consisted of 75 simple, multiple-choice questions written 
by the authors about topics such as geography, current events, arts and culture, sports, and 
arithmetic (for a sample of questions, see Appendix B).  We chose what we believed to be simple 
questions because we are interested in help-seekers’ predictions of helper effort, not task 
difficulty or helper competency.  Therefore, answering more than a handful of questions 
incorrectly should indicate that the helper is not paying attention, since he or she should have the 
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knowledge to answer most questions correctly. A manipulation check indicates that we were 
mostly successful in our goal.  Both primary participants and helpers answered 92% of questions 
correctly.  
In terms of layout, two questions appeared per screen or “page,” with the exception of the 
last page, which displayed only the last question.  After answering the questions on each page, 
participants pressed the “next” button to go to the following page.  At no point did participants 
need to scroll up or down the page to see text or provide their responses.  
After finishing the survey, primary participants were told how long the survey had taken 
them to complete by the experimenter who, unbeknownst to the primary participants, had timed 
them.  On average, primary participants spent just over six minutes completing the survey 
(M=6min 8sec, SD=1min 20sec).  Finally, primary participants were asked to fill out a 
questionnaire.  Participants stated how many people they would have to approach until they 
found three people who would agree to participate.  We asked participants to estimate request 
compliance to ensure that this request was not unusual in light of past research demonstrating 
that help-seekers tend to underestimate compliance (Bohns et al., 2011; Bohns, Roghanizad, & 
Xu, 2014; Flynn & Lake (Bohns), 2008; Newark et al., 2014).  Subsequently, participants 
estimated three different measures of help effort.  First, they indicated, on average, how many of 
the 75 survey questions secondary participants would answer before they stopped.  Second, 
participants estimated how many questions, on average, secondary participants would answer 
correctly.  Again, because the trivia questions were relatively straightforward, the number of 
questions answered correctly should reflect effort rather than knowledge or ability.  This measure 
was intended to capture whether secondary participants were actually reading the questions and 
trying to answer them correctly, or simply choosing responses at random.  Third, participants 
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estimated how long, on average, the secondary participants who agreed to participate would 
spend answering questions.  
Results 
 Consistent with prior research on expectations of help compliance (Flynn & Lake 
(Bohns), 2008), participants overestimated how many strangers they would need to approach 
before finding three who were willing to help (predicted: M=7.79, SD=3.59, actual: M=4.13, 
SD=1.42), paired t(47)2=7.05, p<.001, d=1.02.  Also, as predicted, participants underestimated 
the effort that helpers would put into their assistance.  First, primary participants significantly 
underestimated the number of questions that secondary participants would answer in their 
attempt to help primary participants.  Though primary participants thought that secondary 
participants would answer, on average, only 24.74 questions (SD=17.57), secondary participants 
actually answered 49.03 questions (SD=19.71), paired t(47)=-7.34, p<.0001, d=1.06.   
 Primary participants also underestimated how many questions secondary participants 
would answer correctly, predicting that secondary participants would answer, on average, 18.66 
(SD=14.55) questions correctly, when in reality secondary participants answered 45.39, 
(SD=18.80) questions correctly, paired t(45)=-8.26, p<.0001, d=1.22.  This underestimation held 
even after converting primary participants’ predictions into predictions of the percentage of 
questions that secondary participants would answer correctly, to account for their 
underestimation of the number of questions that secondary participants would answer overall 
(Predicted: M=79%, SD=16%, Actual: M=92%, SD=5%), paired t(45)=-5.77, p<.0001, d=0.85.   
                                                 
2 Throughout the paper’s analyses, fluctuations in degrees of freedom within a given study result 
from instances in which a participant did not answer a particular question, consequently reducing 
the sample size for that question. 
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 Finally, primary participants underestimated the time that secondary participants would 
spend answering questions (Predicted: M=3min26sec, SD=2min27sec, Actual: M=4min34sec, 
SD=2min7sec), paired t(46)=-2.76, p=.008, d=0.40.  However, we note that this result may be 
driven primarily by participants at one of the two campuses, since, although the pattern of results 
was the same at both locations, predictions of how much time secondary participants would 
spend answering questions differed between locations.    
Discussion 
 Our first study suggests that help-seekers do, in fact, underestimate help effort in addition 
to compliance.  In this study, helpers answered more questions, answered more questions 
correctly (and a greater percentage of questions correctly), and spent more time answering 
questions than help-seekers anticipated.  In Study 2, we sought to test whether this 
underestimation of effort was particular to help-seekers predicting the effort that helpers would 
spend on them, or whether individuals tended to underestimate the effort that others would spend 
on a task regardless of who stood to benefit.  
Study 2: Predicting the Effort a Helper Will Spend on Oneself— 
A Unique Underestimation Effect  
 In our second study, we sought to examine whether the underestimation of effort we 
found in Study 1 is particular to helping scenarios, as we contend, or whether it is merely an 
instance of a more general tendency for people to underestimate the effort that others expend. 
Participants 
 Two hundred twenty-four participants (79 women, MAge=33.21, SDAge=9.72) from 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk took part in this study in exchange for $0.25.   
Procedure and Materials 
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 This study used a 2(Letter-Writer Condition: Self, Other) X 2(Beneficiary Condition: 
Self, Other) between-subjects design. Each participant was asked to imagine a scenario in which 
an individual applying for a job requires a letter in support of her candidacy.  This letter was to 
be written either by oneself or someone else.  In particular, each participant was assigned to one 
of exactly four conditions.  In the first condition (another’s effort benefits you), the participant 
imagined that she was applying for a job and, as part of her application, had asked a former 
colleague to write a letter in support of her candidacy.  In the second condition (your effort 
benefits another), the participant imagined that a former colleague was applying for a job for 
which she had asked the participant to write a letter in support of her candidacy.  In the third 
condition (another’s effort benefits herself), the participant imagined that a former colleague was 
applying for a job for which she would write a letter in support of her own candidacy.  In the 
fourth condition (your effort benefits you), the participant imagined that she was applying for a 
job for which she would write a letter in support of her own candidacy.  
 After imagining their respective scenarios, participants estimated how much effort the 
letter writer would spend on the letter of support by answering two questions.  First, participants 
answered, on a scale from 1=Very little to 7=A great deal, “How much effort would [your 
former colleague/you] put into the letter supporting [your/his or her] candidacy?”  Then, 
participants answered, on a scale from 1=Not at all to 7=Extremely, “How hard would [your 
former colleague/you] work at the letter supporting [your/his or her] candidacy?”  Finally, 
participants were asked to report their age and gender.     
Results 
 To test whether the underestimation of effort effect we found in our first study was 
particular to people estimating how much effort a potential helper would expend on them, or 
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whether people underestimated how much effort others would expend in general, we analyzed 
the data from this study and found a significant interaction of Letter-Writer Condition with 
Beneficiary Condition, F(1, 220)=12.69, p<.001, p=0.06.  Consistent with Study 1, we found 
that participants asked to estimate how much effort another person would put into helping them 
predicted significantly less expenditure of effort compared to participants asked to estimate how 
much effort they would put into helping someone else (help-seekers: M=5.15, SD=1.09; helpers: 
M=5.74, SD=1.15), F(1, 112)=7.92, p=.006, d=0.53.  However, when we examined participants’ 
predictions of how much effort someone else would expend on the support letter for themselves 
to their reports of how much effort they would expend on their own support letter, we found no 
significant difference between the two estimations (predicted effort you would spend on you: 
M=5.88, SD=1.20; reported effort I would spend on me: M=6.12, SD=1.21), F(1, 108)=1.14, 
p=.289, d=0.20.     
Discussion 
 In our second study, we found that individuals do not always underestimate the effort that 
others will expend.  Rather, the underestimation of effort is particular to helping situations in 
which help-seekers estimate how much effort helpers will spend on them.  In our third study, 
participants imagined a series of four helping scenarios in order to increase the generalizability 
of our results and explore the mechanism driving this underestimation of help effort effect.     
Study 3: Discomfort as a Mechanism for the Underestimation of Help Effort  
in a Scenario Study 
In our third study, we sought to identify the psychological mechanism through which 
help-seekers tend to underestimate the effort that helpers will put into their assistance.  Drawing 
on previous research on help-seekers’ underestimations of the likelihood of request compliance 
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(Bohns, 2016; Bohns et al., 2011; Bohns et al., 2016; Bohns, Roghanizad, & Xu, 2014; Flynn & 
Lake (Bohns), 2008; Newark et al., 2014), we hypothesized that help-seekers’ failure to 
appreciate helpers’ discomfort may play a key role.  However, in testing this established 
mechanism, we also wanted to consider other potential mechanisms that have not been examined 
and to better specify what drives the discomfort that has been identified in previous research.  In 
particular, (a) we wanted to test whether help-seekers’ failure to appreciate the positive feelings 
helpers associate with assistance may mediate the underestimation of help effort effect 
(Andreoni, 1990; Cialdini & Kenrick, 1976; Cunningham, Steinberg, & Grev, 1980) and (b) 
should it indeed turn out that discomfort mediated the underestimation of help effort effect, we 
wanted to examine the source of that discomfort.  Specifically, we sought to distinguish between 
two types of discomfort: discomfort about how the helper would look if he or she did a bad job 
helping (i.e., how embarrassed he or she would feel; Bohns et al., 2011; Grant & Mayer, 2009), 
and discomfort about the situation the help-seeker would be in if the helper did a bad job helping 
(i.e., how guilty he or she would feel; Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994; Bohns & 
Flynn, 2013; Carlsmith & Gross, 1969; Lindsey, Yun, & Hill, 2007).  
Participants 
One hundred ninety-six participants (128 women, MAge=36.20, SDAge=11.62) from 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk took part in this study in exchange for $0.50.   
Procedure and Materials 
 Participants were assigned to one of only two conditions: help-seeker or helper.  
Participants in the help-seeker condition read exactly four scenarios in which they imagined 
asking a colleague for assistance and then having that colleague agree to help.  The scenarios 
involved asking for help with an upcoming presentation, learning a new computer software, the 
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stuffing and addressing of envelopes, and the preparation of a client report (for complete 
scenarios, see Appendix C).  Helpers read about the same scenarios, but instead of imagining 
asking for and receiving help, they imagined being asked for and giving help.   
 After each scenario, participants were asked a series of questions about the extent to 
which the helper would feel discomfort and positive emotions, depending on how helpful she 
was.  These questions were further divided into discomfort and positive emotions stemming from 
how the helper expected to be perceived by the help-seeker (helper’s concern about his or her 
self-image) and discomfort and positive emotions stemming from the position the help-seeker 
would be in (helper’s concern about the help-seeker’s situation).  The three questions pertaining 
to each of the four potential mechanisms (i.e., discomfort from self-image, discomfort from the 
help-seeker’s situation, positive feelings from self-image, and positive feelings from the help-
seeker’s situation) are presented in Table 1.  Participants were asked to indicate the extent to 
which they agreed with each of the 12 statements on a scale from 1=Disagree strongly to 
7=Agree strongly.  
 
   ---------------Insert Table 1 About Here--------------- 
 
 Next, participants were asked three questions about how much effort the helper would put 
into helping.  These questions were, (a) “How much effort will [your colleague/you] be willing 
to put into helping [you/your colleague]?,” answered on a scale from 1=Very little to 7=A great 
deal, (b) “Chances are [your colleague/you] will...,” answered on a scale from 1=Do the bare 
minimum [he or she/you] can to help to 7=Do everything [he or she/you] can to help, and (c) 
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“How much time will [your colleague/you] be willing to spend helping [you/your colleague]?,” 
answered on a scale from 1=Very little to 7=A great deal.  
For each scenario, the six questions pertaining to discomfort ( for each scenario ≥ .94), 
the six questions pertaining to positive feelings ( for each scenario ≥ .92), and the three 
questions pertaining to helper effort ( for each scenario ≥ .90) were combined into a single 
index. 
Results 
 We conducted a 2(Perspective: Help-seeker, Helper) X 4(Individual Scenarios) mixed-
model ANOVA with repeated measures on the second factor to test whether the pattern of results 
was the same across all four scenarios.  The interaction of Perspective and Scenario was not 
significant with either of our mediating mechanisms [Discomfort: F(1, 194)=1.03, p=.31, 
p=0.005; Positive Emotions: F(1, 194)=0.31, p=.58, p=0.002] or helper effort [F(1, 
194)=0.15, p=.70, p=0.001] as the dependent variable, indicating that the pattern of results was 
consistent across scenarios.  Noting this, we collapsed the data across all four scenarios, creating 
a single variable for each potential mediating mechanism and a single variable for helper effort.  
 Consistent with our first two studies, help-seekers’ expectations of helper effort (M=5.09, 
SD=1.00) were significantly lower than the effort helpers reported they would provide (M=5.36, 
SD=0.98), F(1, 194)=3.97, p=.048, d=0.27.   
 When examining our potential mediating mechanisms, we found that help-seekers 
significantly underestimated the discomfort helpers would feel if they did not do enough to help 
(help-seekers: M=3.71, SD=1.30; helpers: M=4.28, SD=1.37), F(1, 194)=9.12, p=.003, d=0.43.  
They did not, however, underestimate the positive feelings that helpers would experience if they 
did do enough to help (help-seekers: M=5.30, SD=0.90; helpers: M=5.48, SD=0.98), F(1, 
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194)=1.69, p=.20, d=0.19.  This result suggests that, consistent with prior research, it is 
perceptions of discomfort, rather than positive emotions, that are more likely to mediate the 
relationship between perspective and expectations of helper effort.  To test whether this was the 
case, we conducted a 1,000 bootstrap samples mediation analysis using the PROCESS macro for 
SPSS (Preacher & Hayes, 2008) with perspective as the IV, helper effort as the DV, and 
discomfort as the mediator.  In this analysis, the 95% bias-corrected confidence interval for the 
indirect effect of discomfort on help effort did not include zero, Indirect Effect=-0.13, SE=0.06, 
95% CI [-0.30, -0.05] (Table 2).  This result was replicated when we added positive emotions as 
a parallel mediator: The 95% bias-corrected confidence interval for the indirect effect of 
discomfort on help effort still did not include zero, Indirect Effect=-0.04, SE=.03, 95% CI [-0.13, 
-0.001] (Table 2).  However, the 95% bias-corrected confidence interval for the indirect effect of 
positive emotions on help effort did include zero, Indirect Effect=-0.12, SE=.09, 95% CI [-0.30, 
0.07] (Table 2).      
 Having found support for discomfort’s mediating role in help-seekers’ underestimations 
of help effort (a finding consistent with previous work on help-seekers’ underestimations of 
request compliance), we next sought to identify the source of this discomfort.  To do this, we 
divided our discomfort variable in two.  The first variable, capturing helpers’ discomfort about 
how they would look (i.e., how embarrassed they would feel; Grant & Mayer, 2009), consisted 
of participants’ answers to questions about how embarrassed, ashamed, and bad the helper would 
feel about how she looked to her colleague if she did a bad job helping (=.96).  The second 
variable, capturing helpers’ discomfort about the help-seekers’ situation (i.e., how guilty they 
would feel), consisted of participants’ answers to questions about how guilty, uncomfortable, and 
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bad helpers would feel about the situation help-seekers would be in if helpers did a bad job 
helping (=.96).      
 Independent-samples t-tests revealed that help-seekers significantly underestimated both 
helpers’ image-based discomfort (help-seekers: M=3.57, SD=1.32; helpers: M=4.13, SD=1.42), 
t(194)=2.83, p=.005, d=0.41, as well as helpers’ situation-based discomfort (help-seekers: 
M=3.85, SD=1.29; helpers: M=4.43, SD=1.39), t(194)=3.05, p=.003, d=0.43.  However, when 
we tested both of these potential mechanisms as mediators, only situation-based discomfort was 
significant.  Specifically, we conducted a 1,000 bootstrap samples mediation analysis (Preacher 
& Hayes, 2008) with perspective as the IV, helper effort as the DV, and discomfort about the 
helper’s self-image and discomfort about the help-seeker’s situation as parallel mediators.  In this 
analysis, the only 95% bias-corrected confidence interval that did not include zero was the 
indirect effect of discomfort over the situation the help-seeker would be in if the helper did not 
do enough to help, Indirect Effect=-.14, SE=.09, 95% CI [-.370, -.007] (Table 2).      
 
---------------Insert Table 2 About Here--------------- 
 
Discussion 
 As in our first two studies, we found that help-seekers significantly underestimated the 
effort that helpers would put into their assistance across four different scenarios.  Consistent with 
research on help-seekers’ underestimation of request compliance, we found that this 
underestimation is driven by help-seekers’ failure to appreciate the discomfort that helpers may 
feel if they did not do enough to help.  This was the case even when we tested an alternative 
potential mechanism that had not been examined in this context before, namely the possibility 
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that underestimation of help effort was driven by help-seekers’ failure to appreciate the positive 
emotions that helpers anticipated feeling if they were helpful.  Furthermore, we were able to 
specify that the potential discomfort driving helpers’ effort is not discomfort about how they 
might look to help-seekers if they did not do enough to help; rather, it is discomfort about the 
situation help-seekers would be in if they did not do enough to help.     
Study 4: Discomfort as a Mechanism for the Underestimation of Help Effort  
in a Behavioral Study 
 In our final study, we sought to replicate our main finding once again, and to test our 
proposed mediator, in a different behavioral context.   
Participants 
One hundred two participants (65 women, MAge=23.97, SDAge=7.47) were paid between 
$10.75 and $12 to participate in this live interaction study.  
Procedure and Materials  
 Participants arrived to an American university’s behavioral lab, where they were paired 
with another participant whom they did not know.  After being welcomed by the experimenter, 
each pair of participants was asked to read the following study description: 
Welcome and thank you for taking part in this study.  Today, one of you will be assigned the role 
of quiz-taker and one of you will be assigned the role of note-taker.  The person assigned the role 
of note-taker will receive $12 for participating in this study.  The person assigned the role of quiz-
taker will receive $7, plus an additional amount between $0 and $4.25, depending on his or her 
performance on the quiz.3   
                                                 
3 We note that these incentives mean that the helper will always earn between $0.75 and $5 more 
than the help-seeker.  Needing to choose a particular payoff structure, we chose this one as 
opposed to others (e.g., the helper always making less than the help-seeker, or the helper making 
more than the help-seeker before the help-seekers’ bonus was factored in but potentially less 
after) to reflect the reality that often when we ask another for help it is to improve our situation, 
but not to improve it so much that it then surpasses the helper’s own situation.  Perhaps putting 
helpers in an advantageous position relative to help-seekers in this way might predispose them to 
be more helpful than they would be otherwise, thereby biasing our results.  But recall that all 
participants were informed of the payoff structure at the beginning of the experiment.  If being in 
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The person assigned the role of quiz-taker will be quizzed on a 10-minute TED Talk video on 
public speaking.  For each of the 17 quiz questions the quiz-taker answers correctly, he or she will 
receive an additional $0.25.  However, the quiz-taker will not be allowed to watch this video.  
Instead, the note-taker will watch the video and take notes on a laptop.  The quiz-taker will then 
use these notes to take the quiz.  The note-taker will receive $12 regardless of how many quiz 
questions the quiz-taker answers correctly.   
 
We will flip a coin to randomly decide who takes the quiz and who watches the video and takes 
notes.  If you have any questions, please ask the experimenter at this time.  
 
After participants read the study description, the experimenter summarized its contents 
verbally and asked if there were any questions.  Participants then signed a consent form, before 
being randomly assigned to either the role of quiz-taker (help-seeker) or note-taker (helper).    
At this point, the quiz-taker remained seated while the experimenter escorted the note-
taker to a separate room. Once in the room, the note-taker found an iPad with the TED Talk 
video4, a laptop (with internet disabled) open to a clean Word document for taking notes, a piece 
of paper with instructions and a series of questions, and a pen.  The experimenter drew the note-
taker’s attention to the piece of paper, at the top of which was written, “Before beginning the 
video and note-taking, please answer the following questions.”  This instruction was followed by 
three questions about the discomfort helpers would feel regarding the quiz-taker’s situation in the 
event they put little effort into helping.  These questions, which note-takers answered on a scale 
from 1=Not at all to 7=Extremely, were, “How guilty/bad/uncomfortable would you feel about 
the situation the person taking the quiz would be in if you didn’t put much effort into your 
                                                 
an advantageous position predisposes helpers to be more helpful, help-seekers had the 
opportunity to account for this in their estimations, but failed to do so.  That said, it would be 
worthwhile for future research to examine whether the relationship between helping behavior 
and expectations differs if the help is intended to leave the help-seeker (a) better off than she was 
before but still worse off than the helper, (b) just as well off as the helper, or (c) better off than 
the helper.         
 
4 The video is entitled “Julian Treasure: How to speak so that people want to listen,” and is 
available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eIho2S0ZahI 
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notes?”  We chose these questions based on the results of Study 3, which showed that discomfort 
about the help-seeker’ situation is what drives the underestimation of help effort.  We combined 
the three measures of discomfort into a single composite variable (=.91).  After these questions, 
the remaining text on the paper read, “When you are ready to begin the video and take notes, 
please press play.  You may pause, rewind, or advance the video whenever you’d like.  Once you 
have completed your notes, please open your door to signal that you are done.” 
  After escorting the note-taker to the separate room, the experimenter returned to the quiz-
taker and gave her a copy of the quiz she would be taking, as well as a piece of paper with 
exactly nine questions.  First, quiz-takers were asked to answer (on a scale from 1=Not at all to 
7=Extremely) the same three questions about note-takers’ discomfort that note-takers had 
answered: “How guilty/bad/uncomfortable would the person taking notes feel about the situation 
you would be in if he or she didn’t put much effort into his or her notes?”  Next on the sheet of 
paper, quiz-takers were asked, “How much effort will the person taking notes put into his or her 
notes?” (answered on a scale from 1=Very little to 7=A large amount) and “How hard will the 
person taking notes work at his or her notes?” (answered on a scale from 1=Not at all to 
7=Extremely).  After answering these questions, quiz-takers were asked on the sheet of paper to 
look at the 17-question quiz they would be taking (Appendix D) and estimate how many of the 
questions they would be able to answer correctly based on the notes they would be given.  
Finally, quiz-takers filled in their age, gender, and relationship to the note-taker.  The 
experimenter then gathered the completed questionnaires.    
 When the note-taker opened the door to signal she had completed her notes, the 
experimenter collected the sheet she had filled out previously and handed her a second sheet with 
exactly six questions.  First, note-takers were asked, “How much effort did you put into your 
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notes?” (answered on a scale from 1=Very little to 7=A large amount) and “How hard did you 
work at your notes?” (answered on a scale from 1=Not at all to 7=Extremely).  Next, the sheet 
contained the quiz questions that the quiz-taker would be asked to answer and the note-taker was 
asked to estimate how many of the 17 questions the quiz-taker would be able to answer correctly 
based on the note-taker’s notes. 5  Finally, the note-taker was asked her age, gender, and 
relationship to the quiz-taker.   
 Note-takers were given approximately two minutes to fill out this questionnaire, while 
the experimenter went to fetch the quiz-taker.  When the experimenter returned with the quiz-
taker, he took the second questionnaire from the note-taker, took the iPad with the video from the 
room, left the quiz-taker with the notes to take the quiz, and escorted the note-taker to the front 
of the laboratory to receive her $12 payment.  When the quiz-taker finished the quiz, it was 
graded, and the quiz-taker was paid accordingly.            
Results  
Help-seekers underestimated help effort according to each of the three measures we 
collected.  Specifically, help-seekers underestimated how much effort helpers would put into 
their assistance (Predicted: M=5.10, SD=1.12; Actual: M=6.27, SD=0.67), paired t(50)=-6.21, 
p<.001, d=0.87 as well as how hard helpers would work (Predicted: M=4.96, SD=1.22; Actual: 
M=6.18, SD=0.77), paired t(50)=-5.50, p<.001, d=0.77.  Help-seekers also underestimated our 
behavioral measure of help effort.  Whereas help-seekers predicted that the effort helpers put into 
their notes would allow them to answer, on average, 11.2 (SD=2.38) of the 17 quiz questions 
                                                 
5 Though we asked this question, we did not end up finding it relevant to any of our subsequent 
analyses.  However, we note here that helpers accurately predicted the number of quiz questions 
that help-seekers would be able to answer correctly based on their notes (helpers’ predicted: 
M=16.61, SD=1.08; actual: M=16.73, SD=0.49), paired t(50)=-0.75, p=.46, d=0.11.   
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correctly, in reality they were able to answer, on average, 16.74 (SD=0.49) of the 17 quiz 
questions correctly, paired t(49)=-16.99, p<.001, d=2.40.     
In addition to underestimating help effort, we found that, as predicted, help-seekers also 
failed to capture the discomfort that helpers would feel concerning the help-seeker’s situation if 
they did not do enough to help.  Help-seekers significantly underestimated the discomfort (i.e., 
guilt, bad feelings, and uncomfortableness) about their situation helpers would feel if helpers did 
not put much effort into their assistance (help-seekers: M=4.75, SD=1.34; helpers: M=5.71, 
SD=1.17; paired t(50)=-3.72, p=.001, d=0.52). 
Finally, we note that all of our dyads reported being strangers except for one, which 
reported being acquaintances.  In addition, a help-seeker’s tendency to underestimate help effort 
or discomfort did not depend significantly on his or her gender.      
Mediation Analysis 
To test whether discomfort about the help-seeker’s situation in the case of poor effort 
once again mediated help-seekers’ underestimation of help effort, we combined our three 
measures of help effort (amount of effort, amount of work, and number of questions answered 
correctly) into a single composite variable.  Since our measures of help-effort were taken on 
different scales, we first converted them to z-scores before combining them into a single index of 
help effort (=.86).  As expected, a paired samples t-test showed that help-seekers (M=-0.65, 
SD=0.77) underestimated the effort that helpers (M=0.62, SD=0.42) would put into their 
assistance according to this composite variable, paired t(49) =-9.85, p<.001, d=1.39. 
 Next, we conducted a 1,000 bootstrap samples mediation analysis using the PROCESS 
macro for SPSS (Preacher & Hayes, 2008).  With perspective as the IV, help effort as the DV, 
and discomfort about the help-seeker’s situation as mediator, the 95% bias-corrected confidence 
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interval for the indirect effect of discomfort did not include zero, Indirect Effect=-.25, SE=.10, 
95% CI [-.483, -.085].   
Discussion 
 In this behavioral study, help-seekers again underestimated the effort that helpers would 
expend to assist them.  We also found evidence supporting the mechanism we identified in Study 
3: Help-seekers’ tendency to underestimate helpers’ effort stems from their failure to appreciate 
the discomfort (the guilt of letting someone down) that helpers would feel should they not do 
enough to help, thereby leaving help-seekers in an undesirable situation.   
General Discussion 
Across four studies, help-seekers underestimated the effort that helpers would expend.  In 
Study 1, help-seekers underestimated how much effort helpers would put into a trivia/scavenger 
hunt task in which their chances of winning an Amazon certificate were directly tied to helpers’ 
efforts.  In Study 2, we found evidence that this underestimation of effort is particular to 
scenarios in which help-seekers estimate the effort of those who will help them rather than a 
general tendency for people to underestimate the effort of others.  Studies 3 and 4 explored the 
psychological mechanism driving this behavior.  Consistent with previous research on request 
compliance, in Study 3 we found that help-seekers tend to underestimate helper effort because 
they fail to appreciate the discomfort that helpers associate with being unhelpful.  Seeking to 
further clarify this mechanism, we found that this discomfort stems specifically from concerns 
about the situation the help-seeker would be in absent meaningful aid, rather than concerns about 
how the helper would appear in the eyes of the help-seeker should she fail to provide assistance.  
Study 4 replicated our main effect and the mechanism we identified in Study 3 in a behavioral 
study in which one person took notes on a TED Talk video that another person then relied on to 
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take a quiz.  The quiz-taker received financial compensation for each question answered 
correctly, while the note-taker had no financial incentive to help.  
The finding that help-seekers underestimate help effort provides an important 
complement to extant findings that help-seekers underestimate the likelihood that others will 
comply with their requests for help (Bohns, 2016; Bohns et al., 2011; Bohns et al., 2016; Flynn 
& Lake (Bohns), 2008; Newark et al., 2014; Roghanizad & Bohns, 2017).  Estimations of the 
likelihood of compliance only tell half the story.  To understand help-seekers’ willingness (and 
reluctance) to ask for help, we must understand not only how likely they think their requests are 
to be rejected, but also how valuable or beneficial they think it would be for their requests to be 
accepted.  
The current findings about help effort are notable because research on the anticipated 
quality of help has been so scant.  One can imagine at least two reasons for this oversight.  First, 
studies on helping behavior have rarely involved actual help.  Concerned chiefly with when a 
potential helper would say “yes” to a request, researchers often have not focused on how a task, 
once agreed to, would be carried out (e.g., Cialdini et al., 1975; Freedman & Fraser, 1966).  As a 
result, opportunities to observe help effort have been limited.  Second, in studies where helpers 
actually performed help tasks, often those tasks (e.g., lending a cellphone, completing a 
questionnaire, or giving money) have not allowed for much variance in help quality (Burger, 
1986; Cialdini et al., 1999; Epley & Dunning, 2000; Flynn & Lake (Bohns), 2008; Newark et al., 
2014), thus limiting the chance to gauge the caliber of help people tend to give, much less the 
caliber of help people anticipate receiving.  Though it is true that some helping tasks are more 
binary, in that they are either completed or they are not (e.g., a ride to the airport), many helping 
tasks can be performed more or less well, with more or less effort (e.g., providing feedback on a 
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report or presentation a colleague is preparing, advocating on someone’s behalf, or helping 
someone learn a new task at work). 
The present studies further our understanding of how discomfort accounts for erroneous 
estimations of helping behavior.  Though past research had identified discomfort as a key driver 
of helping behavior (Bohns et al., 2011; Flynn & Lake (Bohns), 2008; Newark et al., 2014), the 
source of that discomfort was unclear.  Our findings suggest that it is helpers’ guilt about putting 
a help-seeker in a bad situation, rather than their shame about appearing unhelpful that help-
seekers fail to understand.  We also confirmed empirically that it is helpers’ desire to avoid these 
negative emotions associated with being unhelpful more than their desire to experience the 
positive emotions associated with being helpful that help-seekers seem not to appreciate.   
Limitations and Future Directions 
We note that greater effort on the part of helpers does not necessarily translate into higher 
quality help.  For example, a talented letter writer may be able to provide a more persuasive 
letter of recommendation with less effort than a less talented letter writer.  In addition, one could 
argue that if the applicant did not receive the position she seeks, the letter was not helpful at all, 
regardless of how much talent or effort went into it.  Despite these exceptions, effort is, on 
average, a key determinant of help quality.  All else being equal, the harder helpers work, the 
more helpful they are likely to be.  As a result, these studies suggest that the consequences of not 
asking for help are graver than was previously thought.  Not only are people more willing to help 
than we expect, but the quality of help they are ready to provide is also likely to be higher than 
we anticipate.  
Nonetheless, the implications of our main finding are complicated somewhat by the 
mechanism behind it.  Though some may be more inclined to ask for assistance upon learning 
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that they may be underestimating its value, others may be less inclined to ask for assistance upon 
learning that the reason they underestimate its value is that they underestimate the potential 
discomfort they expose helpers to with their request.  One possibility is a segmented effect across 
people.  Perhaps for those most sensitive to the burden they place on others, this information 
would decrease their willingness to seek help.  For those more focused on their own self-interest 
or otherwise less concerned about making others uncomfortable, the information could have the 
opposite effect.  This insight could also influence behavior within, not just across, people.  For 
example, some people may be less inclined to make relatively unimportant requests because they 
do not want to risk making others uncomfortable; they may pause before taking an “it can’t hurt 
to ask” attitude.  However, the same people may also be more inclined to make relatively 
important requests because they realize the kind of help that is at stake.  
Going forward, it would be valuable to conduct research in which those in need of help 
had more freedom to decide how to ask for it and even whether to ask for it.  In our first 
behavioral study we provided help-seekers with a script to use when approaching helpers.  And, 
in all of our studies, we did not give help-seekers the option of whether to ask for help.  Having 
established this baseline effect, future studies could ease some of this control by letting help-
seekers ask for help however they wish, or by giving them the option of not asking for help, and 
then seeing how these forms of agency impact expectations.   
 Future studies could also examine how expectations of more objective components of 
help quality studied here interact with expectations of more subjective components.  When 
attempting to determine the expected value of another person’s help, an individual is likely to 
consider relatively objective measures of help effort.  In our studies, this means considering 
questions like, How many questions will this person choose to answer?, or, How hard will this 
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person work at taking notes?  However, there are likely other, more subjective, factors that 
contribute to the value of help beyond these objective considerations.  For example, How has this 
helping exchange affected my relationship with the helper? Or, How does this exchange affect 
the helper’s perception of me?  Research in the domain of advice seeking suggests that help-
seekers may similarly underestimate these other, more subjective, contributors to the value of 
provided help.  For instance, Brooks, Gino, and Schweitzer (2015) found that people were 
reluctant to seek advice for fear of appearing incompetent, while, in fact, seeking advice made 
them appear more competent in the eyes of advice-givers.  Combining these lines of research to 
explore, in tandem, help-seekers’ estimations of both objective benefits as well as more 
subjective, relational, and reputational benefits of receiving help would provide a fuller picture 
of help-seekers’ expectations and their likelihood of seeking assistance. 
Future research could also investigate potential boundary conditions to our findings.  For 
example, in both of our behavioral studies, participants received help from members of their 
community they did not know.  In our scenario studies, participants imagined situations between 
colleagues.  Perhaps our pattern of results would have been different had participants instead 
received help from strangers, friends and family, or people of different social or professional 
status.  In addition, the help being requested and provided in our experiments was likely not seen 
as routine.  It would be important to examine whether predictions of help effort are more 
accurate when they pertain to a kind of help that one frequently gives or receives.  Lastly, the 
help being provided in our experiments was likely seen as legitimate by both parties.  If one or 
both people in a helping situation believe the favor to be illegitimate, the relationship between 
actual effort and expected effort may change.  A help-seeker who poses a help request that a 
helper agrees to but fundamentally sees as illegitimate may overestimate help effort.   
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Another direction for subsequent work would be to examine potential mechanisms, 
besides discomfort, that may be driving this effect.  One possibility is that expected and actual 
helper effort depend, respectively, on how much help-seekers think they are liked and how much 
help-seekers actually are liked by the person helping them.  This mechanism may be particularly 
relevant in helping situations between people with established relationships.   
Finally, our findings may contribute to other research literatures, such as organizational 
citizenship behavior (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Paine, & Bachrach, 2000), feedback seeking 
(Ashford, Blatt, & Walle, 2003), and (as described above) advice seeking (Brooks et al., 2015).  
Each of these behaviors has the potential to be seen as a helpful act in which one person can 
benefit from another’s behavior, suggesting the potential for psychological mechanisms and 
behavioral tendencies similar to those documented here.  At the same time, there are interesting 
potential differences between these behaviors.  For example, while advice is a form of help, it is 
a form of help that can be sought, received, and then ignored in a way that a ride to the airport 
cannot.  This gives help-seekers looking for advice an additional layer of agency—they can 
choose whether to ask for advice and then choose whether to follow it (and those who give 
advice generally know this).  In addition, it can be more acceptable or otherwise easier to seek 
help from multiple people simultaneously when the help being sought is advice rather than other 
kinds of assistance.  A help-seeker’s ability to ignore help or easily seek help from multiple 
people may influence her decision to ask for it.  Understanding these kinds of dynamics and the 
extent to which organizational citizenship behavior, feedback seeking, and advice seeking are 
distinct from helping situations, an unremarkable subset of them, or a unique subset with 
particular properties could help broaden the relevance of the current work considerably.      
Conclusion 
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Previous research has shown that help-seekers assume people who agree to help are 
generally “helpful people,” which would suggest a tendency to accurately predict or overestimate 
the effort that helpers are likely to expend.  However, we find that help-seekers tend to 
underestimate help effort because they discount the discomfort helpers would feel if they did not 
do enough to help and thereby left help-seekers in a predicament.  This tendency to 
underestimate help effort has important implications, especially in conjunction with the tendency 
help-seekers have to underestimate compliance with help requests.  If help-seekers underestimate 
the effort helpers are likely to put into assisting them, they may undervalue help and therefore be 
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Table 1: Potential mechanisms in Study 3 
 Positive Negative 
Helper’s Self-Image [My colleague/I] would feel 
happy/good/proud about how 
[he or she/I] would look to 
[me/my colleague] if [he or 
she/I] was helpful. 
[My colleague/I] would feel 
embarrassed/ashamed/bad 
about how [he or she/I] would 
look to [me/my colleague] if 
[he or she/I] didn’t do enough 
to help. 
Help-Seeker’s Situation [My colleague/I] would feel 
happy/good/proud about the 
situation [I/my colleague] 
would be in if [he or she/I] 
was helpful. 
[My colleague/I] would feel 
guilty/uncomfortable/bad 
about the situation [I/my 
colleague] would be in if [he 
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Table 2. Mediation analyses in Study 3.  







SE Lower Upper 
Analysis 1         Discomfort only 
 
Analysis 2         Discomfort with  
positive emotions  
in model 
 
Positive emotions  











































Analysis 3       Discomfort about  
self-image with  
discomfort about  
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Appendix A 
People need help every day, in matters big and small.  Sometimes when people need help, 
they choose to ask for it, either from friends, family members, colleagues, acquaintances, or even 
strangers.  Other times, people need help but decide not to ask for it.   
In this study, we are interested in what people think about when deciding whether or not 
to ask someone for help.  On the following page, you will be asked about what determines 
whether you ask someone for help. 
 
Appendix B — Sample Trivia Questions 
 Which of the following is a country? (Answer choices: Paris, India, Tokyo, Beijing) 
 Who is the founder of Microsoft? (Answer choices: Steve Jobs, Larry Ellison, Jim Clark, 
Bill Gates) 
 Who wrote Hamlet? (Answer choices: Christopher Marlowe, Francis Bacon, William 
Shakespeare, Molière) 
 Which of the following individuals is currently a professional basketball player? (Answer 
choices: Pele, Chris Evert, Rosalind Franklin, Lebron James) 
 What is 73 - 15? (Answer choices: 56, 58, 60, 61) 
 
Appendix C 
Imagine that [you have/a colleague of yours has] an important presentation coming up at 
work.  [One of your colleagues tends/you tend] to give excellent presentations, and since [you 
want/your colleague wants] to make sure [your/the] presentation goes well, [you ask this 
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colleague/he or she asks you] to review [your/the] presentation slides and give [you/] 
feedback.  [Your colleague agrees/You agree]. 
Imagine that [you are/a colleague of yours is] having a difficult time figuring out a new computer 
software at work.  [You want/Your colleague wants] to be able to use this software and you have 
[a colleague with/] strong computer skills, so [you decide/he or she decides] to ask [this 
colleague/you] for a brief tutorial of the program.  [Your colleague agrees/You agree]. 
Imagine that [you are/a colleague of yours is] an event manager preparing to mail out 
information about an important upcoming event.  [You are/Your colleague is] running behind 
schedule, and so [you ask a colleague if he or she would help you/asks you if you would help 
him or her] stuff and address envelopes.  [Your colleague agrees/You agree].     
Imagine [you are new to your company and preparing your/you have a colleague who is new to 
your company and who is preparing his or her] first report for a client.  [You feel/Your colleague 
feels] unsure about how the report should be structured and what it should contain, so [you 
decide/he or she decides] to ask [a colleague/you] who has a lot of experience to read over a draft 
and give [you/] some feedback.  [Your colleague agrees/You agree]. 
Each scenario was then followed by the following text: 
Think about what it would be like to [ask your colleague this favor and to have your colleague 
agree to your request/be asked this favor by your colleague and to agree to his or her 
request].  What would you think?  How would you feel?   
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Appendix D 















3. What are six voice tools that powerful or effective speakers use? 
1. __________________ 
2. __________________ 
3. __________________ 
4. __________________ 
5. __________________ 
6. __________________ 
 
